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Abstract—In recent years a cryptographic community is pay-
ing a lot of attention to the constructions of so called resilient
functions for use mainly in stream cipher systems. Very little
work however has been devoted to random generation of such
functions. This paper tries to fill that gap and presents an al-
gorithm that can generate at random highly nonlinear resilient
functions. Generated functions are analyzed and compared
to the results obtained from the best know constructions and
some upper bounds on nonlinearity and resiliency. It is shown
that randomly generated functions achieve in most cases re-
sults equal to the best known designs, while in other cases fall
just behind such constructs. It is argued that the algorithm
can perhaps be used to prove the existence of some resilient
functions for which no mathematical prove has been given
so far.
Keywords—cryptography, ciphers, Boolean functions, correla-
tion immunity, reslilience, random generation.
1. Introduction
Boolean functions play an important role in virtually any
modern cryptographic system – be it block or stream ci-
phers, private or public key systems, authentication al-
gorithms, etc. As security of these systems relies on
Boolean functions these functions should posses some
speciﬁc criteria that would protect a cryptographic sys-
tem from any existing cryptanalytic attacks, and preferably
make it also immune against any attacks that might be de-
signed in the future. These criteria are called cryptographic
criteria.
It is widely accepted among cryptologists that most impor-
tant criteria are balancedness, high nonlinearity, propaga-
tion criteria, correlation immunity, high algebraic degree.
Unfortunately no Boolean function exists that would fulﬁl
all of these criteria to the maximum, so ﬁnding a crypto-
graphically strong Boolean functions is always a trade-oﬀ
between these criteria and is not a trivial task.
In particular, a functions whose output leaks no information
about its input values is of great importance. Such func-
tions are called correlation immune Boolean functions and
were introduced by T. Siegenthaler in 1984 [32] and ever
since then have been a topic of active research. A balanced
correlation immune function is called a resilient function.
As balancedness is one criterion that should be fulﬁlled
under any circumstances, resilience is a criterion most of-
ten mentioned in the scientiﬁc literature when one talks
about correlation immunity.
Most of the cryptographic criteria is in one way or another
related to nonlinearity of the Boolean function. Highest
nonlinearity is very desirable so most of the research con-
centrates on fulﬁlling the cryptographic criteria while main-
taining a highest possible nonlinearity, which very often
(virtually always) has to be sacriﬁced to some extent.
The approach to ﬁnding a good cryptographic functions
is most often based on speciﬁc algebraic constructions of
Boolean functions with desirable properties – like highly
nonlinear Boolean function with high order of resiliency.
Or constructing bent functions (functions with highest pos-
sible nonlinearity) and then modifying them to fulﬁl other
cryptographic criteria.
In the article the author argues that the use of randomly cho-
sen Boolean functions with good cryptographic properties
(if we are able to ﬁnd such functions) is probably better
than the use of functions with similar parameters which
are obtained by explicit constructions. The main reason is
that explicit constructions usually lead to functions which
have very particular (algebraic or combinatorial) structures,
which may induce weaknesses regarding existing or future
attacks. Therefore, author considered ﬁnding and studying
randomly generated Boolean functions (at least with a few
inputs and outputs) with good cryptographic properties, to
be of high interest.
Based on a algorithm designed by the author which can
generate highly nonlinear functions at random, some com-
parative results are presented that give an insight to diﬀer-
ences between constructed and generated Boolean function
with good cryptographic properties.
Particular emphasis of the paper is on resiliency of highly
nonlinear functions. The random generation algorithm man-
ages to output balanced functions which in some cases have
the highest achievable nonlinearity for a particular number
of variables and/or have higher nonlinearity then some of
the modern methods for obtaining cryptographically strong
Boolean functions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some
basic deﬁnitions and notations that are used throughout the
remainder of the article. In Section 3 a random function
generator is described, which is used as a foundation for
obtaining highly nonlinear resilient functions. Experimen-
tal results and comparisons to other research are given in
Section 4. Then conclusions follow in Section 5.
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2. Preliminaries
We use square brackets to denote vectors like [a1, . . . ,an]
and round brackets to denote functions like f (x1, . . . ,xn).
2.1. Boolean function
Let GF(2) = 〈∑,⊕,•〉 be two-element Galois ﬁeld, where
∑ = {0,1}, ⊕ and • denotes the sum and multiplication
mod 2, respectively. A function f : ∑n 7→ ∑ is an n-ar-
gument Boolean function. Let z = x1 · 2n−1 + x2 · 2n−2 +
. . . + xn · 20 be the decimal representation of argu-
ments (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) of the function f . Let us denote
f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) as yz. Then [y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] is called
a truth table of the function f .
2.2. Linear and nonlinear Boolean functions
An n-argument Boolean function f is linear if it can
be represented in the following form: f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) =
a1x1 ⊕ a2x2 ⊕ . . .⊕ anxn. Let Ln be a set of all n-ar-
gument linear Boolean functions. Let Mn = {g : ∑n 7→
∑ | g(x1,x2, . . . ,xn) = 1 ⊕ f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and f ∈ Ln}.
A set An = Ln ∪Mn is called a set of n-argument aﬃne
Boolean functions. A Boolean function f : ∑n 7→ ∑ that is
not aﬃne is called a nonlinear Boolean function.
2.3. Balance
Let N0[y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] be a number of zeros (0’s)
in the truth table [y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] of function f , and
N1[y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] be a number of ones (1’s). A Boolean
function is balanced if
N0[y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] = N1[y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] .
2.4. Algebraic normal form
A Boolean function can also be represented as a maxi-
mum of 2n coeﬃcients of the algebraic normal form (ANF).
These coeﬃcients provide a formula for the evaluation of
the function for any given input x = [x1,x2, . . . ,xn]:






ai jxix j ⊕ . . .⊕a12...nx1x2 . . .xn ,
where ∑, ⊕ denote modulo 2 summation.
The order of nonlinearity of a Boolean function f (x)
is a maximum number of variables in a product term
with non-zero coeﬃcient aJ , where J is a subset of
{1,2,3, . . . ,n}. In the case where J is an empty set the
coeﬃcient is denoted as a0 and is called a zero order coeﬃ-
cient. Coeﬃcients of order 1 are a1,a2, . . . ,an, coeﬃcients
of order 2 are a12,a13, . . . ,a(n−1)n, coeﬃcient of order n
is a12...n. The number of all ANF coeﬃcients equals 2n.
Let us denote the number of all (zero and non-zero) coef-
ﬁcients of order i of function f as σi( f ). For n-argument
function f there are as many coeﬃcients of a given or-
der as there are i-element combinations in n-element set,







Hamming weight of a binary vector x ∈ ∑n, denoted as
hwt(x), is the number of ones in that vector.
Hamming distance between two Boolean functions f ,g :
∑n 7→ ∑ is denoted by d( f ,g) and is deﬁned as follows:
d( f ,g) = ∑
x∈∑n
f (x)⊕g(x) .
The distance of a Boolean function f from a set of n-ar-
gument Boolean functions Xn is deﬁned as follows:
δ ( f ) = min
g∈Xn
d( f ,g) ,
where d( f ,g) is the Hamming distance between functions f
and g. The distance of a function f a set of aﬃne func-
tions An is the distance of function f from the nearest func-
tion g ∈ An.
The distance of function f from a set of all aﬃne func-
tions is called the nonlinearity of function f and is denoted
by N f .
2.6. Bent functions
A Boolean function f : ∑n 7→∑ is perfectly nonlinear if and
only if f (x)⊕ f (x⊕α) is balanced for any α ∈ ∑n such
that 1 ≤ hwt(α)≤ n.
For a perfectly nonlinear Boolean function, any change of
inputs causes the change of the output with probability
of 0.5.
Meier and Staﬀelbach [24] proved that the set of per-
fectly nonlinear Boolean functions is the same as the set of
Boolean bent functions deﬁned by Rothaus [29].
Perfectly nonlinear functions (or bent functions) have the
same, and the maximum possible distance to all aﬃne func-
tions.
Bent functions are not balanced. Hamming weight of a bent
function equals 2n−1±2 n2−1.
2.7. Walsh transform
Let x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and ω = (ω1,ω2, . . . ,ωn) both be-
long to {0,1}n and x•ω = x1ω1,x2ω2, . . . ,xnωn. Let f (x)
be a Boolean functions on n variables. Then the Walsh
transform of f (x) is a real valued function over {0,1}n that
can be deﬁned as:
Wf (ω) = ∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1) f (x)⊕xω .
The Walsh transform is sometimes called the spectral dis-
tribution or simply the spectra of a Boolean function. It is
an important tool for the analysis of Boolean function.
2.8. Correlation immunity and resilience
Guo-Zhen and Massey [13] have provided a spectral char-
acterisation of correlation immune functions using Walsh
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transform. We can use that as a deﬁnition of correlation
immunity:
A function f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is m-order correlation im-
mune (CI) iﬀ its Walsh transform Wf satisﬁes Wf = 0,
for 1 ≤ hwt(ω) ≤ m. Note that balanced m-order corre-
lation immune functions are called m-resilient functions
and if f is balanced then Wf (0) = 0. Thus, a function
f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) is m-resilient iﬀ its Walsh transform W f
satisﬁes Wf (ω) = 0, for 0 ≤ hwt(ω)≤ m.
By an (n,m,d,x) function we mean an n-variable, m-re-
silient (balanced m-order CI) function with degree d and
nonlinearity x. In the above notation the degree component
is replaced by a ’-’ (i.e., (n,m,−,x)), if we do not want to
specify a degree.
3. Random generation of highly
nonlinear functions
As already mentioned earlier, so called bent Boolean
functions achieve the highest possible nonlinearity. There
exist a number of algorithms for constructing bent
Boolean functions. Such constructions have been given by
Rothaus [29], Kam and Davida [15], Maiorana [17],
Adams and Tavares [1], and others.
Most of the known bent function constructions take bent
functions of n arguments as their input and generate bent
functions of n+2 arguments. One major drawback of these
methods is the fact that they are deterministic. Only short
bent functions (n = 4 or 6) are selected at random and the
resulting function is obtained using the same, deterministic
formula every time. The possible drawback of such ap-
proach (constructions) were stated in the beginning of this
paper.
Drawing bent functions at random is not feasible already
for small number of arguments (n > 6). To make such
generation possible, an algorithm was designed that gen-
erates random Boolean functions in algebraic normal form
thus making use of some basic properties of bent functions
to considerably narrow the search space. This makes the
generation of bent functions feasible for n > 6.
The algorithm for the generation of bent functions in ANF
domain takes as its input the minimum and maximum num-
ber of ANF coeﬃcients of every order that the resulting
functions are allowed to have. Since the nonlinear order
of bent functions is less or equal to n/2, clearly in ANF
of a bent function can not be any ANF coeﬃcient of order
higher then n/2. This restriction is the major reason for
random generation feasibility, since it considerably reduces
the possible search space.
However the fact that bent functions are not balanced pro-
hibits their direct application in the cipher system. Still, as
bent functions achieve maximum possible nonlinearity they
are often used as a foundation for constructing highly non-
linear balanced functions. In recent years some methods
have been proposed that transform bent functions to bal-
anced Boolean functions with minimal loss in nonlinearity.
Examples of such methods are given in [18] and [19]. Still,
balancing bent function can lead to low order of resiliency.
In a quest for a randomly generated, highly nonlinear func-
tion with higher order resiliency the above mentioned ran-
dom bent function generation algorithm has been modiﬁed
to generate such functions. Here again some speciﬁc prop-
erties of resilient functions are crucial.
As already stated there are certain trade-oﬀs involved
among the parameters of a cryptographically sound
Boolean function. As it has been showed by Siegen-
thaler [32] for an n-variable function, of degree d and order
of correlation immunity m the following holds: m+d ≤ n.
Further, if the function is balanced then m+d ≤ n−1.
The generating algorithm is used basically in the same way
as when generating bent functions. Still it operates in the
ANF domain and it takes as its input the number mini-
mal and maximal number of coeﬃcients of every order.
Nonlinear order is restricted according to Siegenthalter’s
ﬁndings and some more precise upper bounds on resilient
order given by Sarkar and Maitra in [30].
Sarkar and Maitra in [30] present some construction meth-
ods for highly nonlinear resilient functions and give upper
bounds on nonlinearity of resilient functions.
For the sake of completeness a Maiorana-McFarland like
construction technique will now be brieﬂy discussed. This
technique is perhaps the most important of all resilient
Boolean functions construction methods and has been in-
vestigated in a number of papers [2, 3, 5, 31]. This con-
struction has been used by Maitra and Sarkar as a basis for
their work.
Let pi be a map from {0,1}r to {0,1}k, where for any
x ∈ {0,1}r, hwt(pi(x)) ≥ m + 1. Let f : {0,1}r+k 7→ {0,1}
be a Boolean function deﬁned as f (x,y) = y•pi(x)⊕g(x),
where x∈ {0,1}r, y∈ {0,1}k and y•pi(x) is the inner prod-
uct of y and pi(x). Then f is m-resilient.
Table 1
Upper bounds on nonlinearity of resilient functions
5 6 7 8 9 10
1 12 24 56 116* 244* 492*
2 8 24 56* 112 240 480
3 0 16 48 112 240* 480
4 0 32 96 224 480*
5 0 64 192 448
6 0 128 384
7 0 256
8 0
Table 1 summarises the results obtained in [30] and gives
upper bounds on nonlinearity of resilient functions for num-
ber of arguments ranging from 5 to 10. The rows repre-
sent the resiliency and the columns represent the number
of variables. Entries with * indicate bounds which have
not yet been achieved. Functions can be constructed with
parameters satisfying the other entries.
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Table 1 can be used as a benchmark for assessing the eﬃ-
cacy of resilient functions construction methods.
4. Experimental results
Now let’s see the results from above mentioned random
resilient function generator against the upper bounds pre-
sented in Table 1.
The maximum nonlinearity is known for all Boolean func-
tions on even number of variables – it is achieved by
bent functions. The maximum nonlinearity for odd variable
Boolean functions is known for n ≤ 7. Also, maximum
nonlinearity question is solved for balanced and resilient
functions on n variables for n ≤ 5 (which is easy to do
by exhaustive computer search). Let’s consider cases for
6 ≤ n ≤ 10.
• n = 6: Maximum nonlinearity for n = 6 is 28 (for
bent functions). Maximum nonlinearity of a bal-
anced function is 26 and construction of such func-
tions is known. Maximum nonlinearities for 1, 2 and
3-resilient functions were shown (be computer
search) to be 24, 24 and 16. Random resilient func-
tion generator presented in this paper is able to gen-
erate 1, 2 and 3-resilient functions.
• n = 7: Maximum nonlinearity of a balanced Boolean
functions for n = 7 is 56. As shown in [30] the
maximum nonlinearities for 1, 2, 3 and 4-resilient
functions are respectively 56, 56, 48, 32. However
2-resilient function with nonlinearity of 56 is not
known. Random generator is able to generate all
these resilient functions except that (7,2,-,56).
• n = 8: Nonlinearity of 8 argument bent function is
120. Maximum (theoretical) nonlinearity for a bal-
anced function is 118, however such function if not
known. Maximum possible nonlinearities for 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5-resilient functions are 116, 112, 112,
96, and 64. The existence of (8,1,-,116) function
is an open problem. Constructions for other func-
tions are known. Random generator can output all
the functions except the not known (8,1,-,116) and
(8,3,-,112).
• n = 9: Maximum nonlinearity of such functions as
an open problem. The known upper bound if 244.
It is easy to construct a function with nonlinearity
of 240. Maximum nonlinearities of resilient func-
tions are 244, 240, 240, 224, 192, 128 for 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6-resilient functions respectively. The genera-
tor is capable of generating (9,1,-,240), (9,2,-,224),
(9,5,-,192) and (9,6,-,128) functions.
• n = 10: The nonlinearity of a bent function is 496.
Maximum nonlinearity of a balanced function is 494,
best know function has linearity of 492. 492, 488,
480, 480, 448, 384, 256 are the nonlinearities of
1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-resilient function. Constructions of
the following functions are not known: (10,1,-,492),
(10,1,-,488), (10,2,-,488), (10,4,-,480). Random
generator can generate the following: (10,1,-,480),
(10,3,-,448), (10,5,-,384), (10,7,-,256).
5. Conclusions
As shown in the previous paragraph, the random resilient
function generator is capable of generating Boolean func-
tions having some very promising cryptographic qualities.
In many cases these functions are on par with the best
known constructions. In other cases they fall slightly short
of best achievable results. In any case they have the ad-
vantage of being truly random and not being restricted by
speciﬁc constraints associated with each speciﬁc design.
One can suspect that such constraints may render the func-
tion (or a cipher system based on it) vulnerable to some
future cryptographic attack.
Also, results presented in this article are the very ﬁrst re-
sults from the resilient function generator. It’s output re-
lies heavily on parameter setting, mainly on the number
of higher order ANF coeﬃcients in the resulting function.
As this dependencies are investigated we might expect still
better results from the generator.
As with generated bent functions, also generated resilient
functions can have a very compact (small) algebraic normal
form which can be utilized for eﬃcient storage and fast
cryptographic routines.
Acknowledgements
This scientiﬁc paper has been ﬁnanced as a research project
from Polish State Committee For Scientiﬁc Research funds
in the years 2004–2006.
References
[1] C. M. Adams and S. E. Tavares, “Generating and counting bi-
nary bent sequences”, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. IT-36,
pp. 1170–1173, 1990.
[2] P. Camion, C. Carlet, P. Charpin, and N. Sendrier, “On correlation
immune functions”, in Adv. Crypt. CRYPTO 1991, Santa Barbara,
USA, 1991, pp. 86–100.
[3] C. Carlet, “More correlation immune and resilient functions over
Galois ﬁelds and Galois rings”, in Adv. Crypt. EUROCRYPT 1997,
Konstanz, Germany, 1997, pp. 422–433.
[4] C. Carlet, “On the coset weight divisibility and nonlinearity of re-
silient and correlation immune functions”, in SETA 2001, Bergen,
Norway, 2001.
[5] S. Chee, S. Lee, D. Lee, and S. H. Sung, “On the correlation im-
mune functions and their nonlinearity”, in Advances in Cryptol-
ogy ASIACRYPT 1996, LNCS. Berlin: Springer, 1996, vol. 1163,
pp. 232–243.
[6] J. A. Clark and J. L. Jacob, “Two stage optimisation in the design
of Boolean functions”, in 5th Australasian Conference on Infor-
mation Security and Privacy, ACISP 2000, E. Dawson, A. Clark,




[7] J. A. Clark, J. L. Jacob, and S. Stepney, “The design of S-boxes
by simulated annealing”, in Int. Conf. Evol. Comput. CEC 2004,
Portland, USA, 2004.
[8] J. A. Clark, J. L. Jacob, and S. Stepney, “Secret agents leave big
footprints: how to plant a cryptographic trapdoor, and why you might
not get away with it”, in Genetic and Evolutionary Computation
Conference GECCO 2003, LNCS. Berlin: Springer, 2003, vol. 2724,
pp. 2022–2033.
[9] J. A. Clark, J. L. Jacob, and S. Stepney, “Functions satisfying mul-
tiple criteria”, in Progress in Cryptology INDOCRYPT 2002, LNCS.
Berlin: Springer, 2002, vol. 2551, pp. 246–259.
[10] J. A. Clark, J. L. Jacob, and S. Stepney, “Searching for cost func-
tions”, in Int. Conf. Evol. Comput. CEC 2004, Portland, USA, 2004,
pp. 1517–1524.
[11] H. Dobbertin, “Construction of bent functions and balanced
functions with high nonlinearity”, in Fast Software Encryption,
1994 Leuven Workshop, LNCS. Berlin: Springer, 1994, vol. 1008,
pp. 61–74.
[12] R. Forre´, “The strict avalanche criterion: spectral properties of
Boolean functions with high nonlinearity”, in Advances in Cryp-
tology: CRYPTO 1988, LNCS. Berlin: Springer, 1990, vol. 403,
pp. 450–468.
[13] X. Guo-Zhen and J. Massey, “A spectral characterization of corre-
lation immune combining functions”, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 569–571, 1988.
[14] X. D. Hou, “On the norm and covering radius of ﬁrst-order
Reed-Muller codes”, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 43, no. 3,
pp. 1025–1027, 1997.
[15] J. B. Kam and G. Davida, “Structured design of substitution-
permutation encryption networks”, IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. C-28,
pp. 747–753, 1979.
[16] K. Kurosawa and T. Satoh, “Generalization of higher order SAC to
vector output Boolean functions”, IEICE Trans., vol. E90, no. 1,
1998.
[17] J. A. Maiorana, “A class of bent functions”, R41 Tech. Paper, 1971.
[18] S. Maity and T. Johansson, “Construction of cryptographically im-
portant Boolean functions”, in INDOCRYPT 2002, Hyderabad, India,
2002, pp. 234–245.
[19] S. Maity and S. Maitra, “Minimum distance between bent and
1-resilient Boolean functions”, in FSE 2004, New Delhi, India, 2004,
pp. 143–160.
[20] S. Maitra, “Highly nonlinear balanced Boolean functions with very
good autocorrelation property”, Tech. Rep. 2000/047, Indian Statis-
tical Institute, Calcutta, 2000.
[21] S. Maitra, “Autocorrelation properties of correlation immune
Boolean functions”, in INDOCRYPT 2001, Chennai, India, 2001,
pp. 242–253.
[22] S. Maitra and E. Pasalic, “Further constructions of resilient Boolean
functions with very high nonlinearity”, in SETA 2001, Bergen,
Norway, 2001.
[23] M. Matsui, “Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher (ab-
stracts)”, in EUROCRYPT 1993, Lofthus, Norway, 1993.
[24] W. Meier and O. Staﬀelbach, “Nonlinearity criteria for crypto-
graphic functions”, in Advances in Cryptology: EUROCRYPT 1989,
J. J. Quisquater, J. Vandewalle, Eds., LNCS. Berlin: Springer, 1989,
vol. 434, pp. 549–562.
[25] W. Millan, A. Clark, and E. Dawson, “Heuristic design of cryp-
tographically strong balanced Boolean functions”, in Advances in
Cryptology: EUROCRYPT 1998, LNCS. Berlin: Springer, 1998,
vol. 1403, pp. 489–499.
[26] K. Nyberg, “Perfect nonlinear S-boxes”, in Advances of Cryptol-
ogy: EUROCRYPT 1991, LNCS. Berlin: Springer, 1991, vol. 547,
pp. 378–386.
[27] E. Pasalic, S. Maitra, T. Johansson, and P. Sarkar, “New con-
structions of resilient and correlation immune Boolean functions
achieving upper bound on nonlinearity”, in Workshop on Cod-
ing Theory, Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics, Elsevier,
2001.
[28] B. Preneel, W. Van Leekwijck, L. Van Linden, R. Govaerts, and
J. Vandewalle, “Propagation characteristics of Boolean functions”,
in Advances in Cryptology: EUROCRYPT 1990, LNCS. Berlin:
Springer, 1991, vol. 473, pp. 161–173.
[29] O. S. Rothaus, “On bent functions”, J. Combin. Theory: Ser. A,
vol. 20, pp. 300–305, 1976.
[30] P. Sarkar and S. Maitra, “New directions in design of resilient
Boolean functions”, Tech. Rep. ASD/2000/04, Indian Statistical In-
stitute, 2000.
[31] J. Seberry, X. M. Zhang, and Y. Zheng, “On constructions and
nonlinearity of correlation immune Boolean functions”, in Ad-
vances in Cryptology: EUROCRYPT 1993, Lofthus, Norway, 1994,
pp. 181–199.
[32] T. Siegenthaler, “Correlation-immunity of nonlinear combining func-
tions for cryptographic applications”, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. IT-30, no. 5, pp. 776–780, 1984.
[33] J. J. Son, J. I. Lim, S. Chee, and S. H. Sung, “Global avalanche char-
acteristics and nonlinearity of balanced Boolean functions”, Inform.
Proces. Lett., vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 139–144, 1998.
[34] S. H. Sung, S. Chee, and C. Park, “Global avalanche characteristics
and propagation criterion of balanced Boolean functions”, Inform.
Proces. Lett., vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 21–24, 1999.
[35] Y. Tarannikov, “On resilient Boolean functions with maximal possi-
ble nonlinearity”, Tech. Rep. 2000/005, Mech. & Math. Department,
Moscow State University, 2000.
[36] X. M. Zhang and Y. Zheng, “GAC – the criterion for global
avalanche characteristics of cryptographic functions”, J. Univ. Com-
put. Sci., vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 316–333, 1995.
Anna Grocholewska-Czuryło
is an adjunct at the Poznań Uni-
versity of Technology. She has
studied and published papers on
a range of topics like natural
language processing, cellular
automata, neural networks and
has ﬁnally focused on data secu-
rity and cryptology, especially
methods of designing Boolean
functions and s-box design. She
has earned her Ph.D. degree entitled: “Pseudobalanced and
Bent Boolean Functions and Algorithms of their Generat-
ing Methods” in 2001.
e-mail: czurylo@sk-kari.put.poznan.pl
Institute of Control and Information Engineering
Poznań University of Technology
Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie Sq. 5
60-965 Poznań, Poland
18
